Ethnocentricity, Cultural Relativism, and the Search for Moral Truth

"I find that there is nothing barbarous and savage in this nation, by anything that I can gather, excepting, that every one gives the title of barbarism to everything that is not in use in his own country."

- Michel de Montaigne in Des Cannibales

This recent article in the New York Times entitled "Of Cannibals, Kings and Culture: The Problem of Ethnocentricity"is a good introduction to some of the issues surrounding ethnocentricity and cultural relativism in the discipline. Using Montaigne's essay Des Cannibales as a starting place, Etinson gives a nice overview of what ethnocentrism is and why the concept is important for anthropology. If you haven't read it, a seemingly decent English translation of the essay can be found here. To summarize, Montaigne uses the arrival of cannibals from Brazil to point out their perceptions of 16th century Europeans and to argue that despite the shocking practice of cannibalism, it is the Europeans who are more barbaric. Realizations that morality and concepts of justice are culturally constituted and make sense only within the worldviews that created them led to the approach of cultural relativism. Etinson points out that this is not a new anthropological concept - the idea of moral relativism (i.e. that moral truth is limited to the culture within which it exists) goes back to Plato. But it certainly became popularized during the height of the Post Modern movement in anthropology.

In anthropology we spend a lot of time trying to step into other cultural worldviews and understand their logics. This includes morals and ethics, which radiate out from certain culturally agreed upon givens. Often when we discuss particularly difficult topics in classes - female genital cutting or ritual fellatio among the Sambia, for example - we approach it through explaining those worldviews and how the practice makes sense within them. Yet, while understanding the logic and cultural purpose of practices helps students grasp their meaning and continuation, they are almost always left with one question. Is it wrong? This is an issue that Etinson grapples with. And it is not an easy one to ever answer. What happens with there are rifts in a society with one group taking advantage of the other? What if the disadvantaged is upset about it and does not buy into the cultural belief that they belong in their place? What if they do buy into it but we as anthropologists see they suffer because of it? What about practices that physically harm members of a society or shorten their lifespans? In short, are there moral truths that transcend cultural variations and worldviews?

Etinson argues from a philosophy standpoint that one of the great things about studying other cultures is that it allows us shine a light back on our own. Looking at our own practices from afar, we are able to reassess their reasoning and purpose and become less ethnocentric in our approach to both communities. As permanent insider-outsiders, anthropologists constantly straddle this line and this gives us that insight not only into our own cultures but the ones which we study as well. I'd argue that we are therefore in a unique position to pick up on the voices of those who are angry, in pain, and disenfranchised. After all, if we can recognize the cultural construction of morality then we can also recognize inequality and the face of anguish.When communities come to us as privileged academics with a Voice, we have a duty to listen. And in listening we may have the ability to empower groups and work with them to make their own changes.